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Romania, along with many other countries in the 
European Union, faces daunting fiscal challenges. 
Fiscal balances deteriorated sharply following the global 
economic crisis, forcing Romania to implement a fiscal 
consolidation that was one of the largest in the European 
Union, but which may not be sustainable without a 
recovery of economic growth. Although the ratio of 
public debt to gross domestic product is still relatively 
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modest, at around 35 percent, long-term fiscal solvency 
is threatened by the costs of funding the public pension 
system in the face of adverse demographic shifts over 
the next 50 years. Because of widespread tax evasion, 
the tax system in Romania is one of the least efficient in 
the European Union. Tax reforms that can reduce the 
amount of tax lost to evasion and fraud could make a 
major contribution to enhancing fiscal sustainability. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Fiscal sustainability has emerged as a key policy issue throughout Europe in recent years, in part 
because the fiscal positions of many countries on the continent were badly affected by the global 
financial  and  economic  crisis  and  also  because  of  an  increasing  public  recognition  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  long-term  fiscal  costs  of  demographic  change,  notably  aging  populations. 
Several  of  the  new  member  states  of  the  European  Union,  including  Romania,  face  major 
challenges  to  ensure  fiscal  sustainability.  The  sustainability  of  Romania’s  public  finances 
deteriorated sharply in the years leading up to the global economic crisis. The global economic 
crisis triggered a severe recession in Romania, exposing the fragility of public finances. To bring 
the  fiscal  deficit  back  into  line  with  the  targets  in  the  EU’s  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  the 
government implemented a draconian fiscal consolidation in 2010, but it still faces huge long-
term  fiscal costs as a  result of population  aging.  Long-term  fiscal  sustainability, along with 
meeting the fiscal criteria required for membership of the Eurozone monetary union, is also 
threatened by the poor management of public expenditures. 
 
Maintaining fiscal sustainability should be a priority for policy makers. An unsustainable fiscal 
position threatens both macroeconomic stability and the financial capacity of the state to deliver 
essential  goods  and  services  to  citizens.  Moreover,  if  fiscal  positions  are  perceived  to  be 
unsustainable over the long term, the reaction of the markets on which governments finance their 
borrowing requirements could trigger a fiscal crisis much sooner than might be expected by 
fiscal planners.  
 
Fiscal sustainability is essentially a forward looking macroeconomic concept which is related to 
the solvency of government. It is closely linked to the future course of the fiscal deficit and the 
evolution of public debt and to the government’s capacity to mobilize finance for the deficit 
and/or to refinance its debt. Alvarado et al. (2004) define a sustainable fiscal policy as a set of 
fiscal policies which will not lead to the government having, at some point in the future, to 3 
 
default on its debt or to monetize its debt, or be forced to undertake a major fiscal retrenchment 
to avoid default or monetization.  
 
A  starting  point  for  analyzing  fiscal  sustainability  is  the  current  levels  and  medium-term 
projections of general government fiscal balances and public debt. It is relatively straightforward 
to  determine  the  impact  of  such  fiscal  balances,  if  extrapolated  forward  into  the  future  and 
combined with some basic macroeconomic projections, on the evolution of public debt levels, 
with debt sustainability being defined as a situation where public debt as a ratio of GDP is stable 
or falling and/or does not exceed some critical threshold.
2 Section 2 of this paper examines the 
general government  fiscal balances and public debt levels in Romania and the medium -term 
projections of these variables. The general government fiscal data include the local governments. 
 
The data captured in the general government budget, however, often provide an incomplete and 
hence misleading picture of the sustainability of public finances over the long term. This is 
starkly illustrated by a comparison of current public debt levels with calculations of the long -
term net worth of the government in Romania, taking into account the long -term costs of aging. 
Romania’s  outstanding  public  debt  amounted  to  32  percent  of  GDP  in  2010,  a  relatively 
moderate level.  In  contrast,  Velculescu  (2010)  estimates  the inter-temporal  net worth  of the 
Romanian government at negative 252 percent of GDP, based on a finite horizon approach and 
negative 1,097 percent of GDP based on an infinite horizon approach.  
 
Risks to fiscal sustainability may emanate from activities of the public sector, which are not 
currently  part  of  the  general  government  budget,  but  which  might  eventually  impose  fiscal 
liabilities on the budget. These could include contingent liabilities of government, such as loan 
guarantees, or the quasi fiscal deficits (QFDs) of state owned enterprises. The QFDs of the state 
owned enterprises are discussed in Section 3.   
                                                 
2 An example of such a threshold is the ceiling of 60 percent of GDP for public debt set by the Stability and Growth 
Pact of the EU for countries which aim to join, or are members of, the Eurozone.   4 
 
A major long-term threat to fiscal sustainability, in Romania and elsewhere in Europe, are what 
Heller (2004: 1) terms “constructive fiscal obligations”. These are obligations such as public 
pensions and other social security payments which government bears for political and social 
reasons and which, although not formal, irrevocable, legal obligations, would nevertheless prove 
difficult for government to renege upon. Constructive fiscal obligations are critical in Romania 
because of the adverse demographic trends that the country faces over the next 50 years. The 
demographic trends and their implications for the public pension system are discussed in Section 
4. 
 
Fiscal sustainability is affected by the revenue side of the budget as well as by expenditure 
obligations. The tax effort in Romania, as measured by the share of tax revenue in GDP, is weak 
in comparison to other EU countries, largely because of extensive tax evasion and weaknesses in 
tax policy. Hence there is scope, through improvements in tax administration, to enhance fiscal 
sustainability  by  reducing  tax  evasion  and  strengthening  revenue  collection.  This  issue  is 
explored in Section 5. 
 
Finally, any evaluation of fiscal sustainability must take into account the inherently political 
nature of fiscal policy. Fiscal policies entail the distribution of resources, both across society at a 
given  point  in  time  and  between  different  generations.  Whether  or  not  fiscal  policies  are 
sustainable is not just a technical issue, to be determined by economists. Given the circumstances 
which prevail in Romania, maintaining fiscal sustainability will entail some sections of society 
bearing a heavy burden. Romania is a democracy and so sustainable fiscal policies will only be 
feasible if they can command support from the electorate over the long term. Romanian voters, 
in common with voters in many other countries, have not shown much support for the austerity 
measures  which  fiscal  consolidation  entails.  Fiscal  policies  are  more  likely  to  be  politically 
feasible if they are perceived to be equitable, in terms of the sharing of the burden of costs, 
compatible with sustainable economic growth and the provision of essential public services, as 
well as being necessary to ensure fiscal sustainability.  
   5 
 
2. Fiscal deficits and public debt in the medium term  
 
2.1 Fiscal deficits 
The fiscal position of the general government and medium term fiscal projections are shown in 
table 1. Romania ran a pro-cyclical fiscal policy during the economic boom of the mid 2000s, 
with a structural fiscal deficit of 8.5 percent of GDP in 2008, at the height of the boom. The 
severe recession which struck the economy in 2009 – real output contracted by 7.1 percent – 
exposed the fragility of the fiscal stance and forced the government to begin to implement a 
radical  fiscal  consolidation.  The  government  has  made  tangible  progress  in  reducing  the 
structural fiscal deficit, to 5.1 percent of GDP in 2010 and to a projected 2.8 percent of GDP in 
2011; if the latter target is achieved there will have been a fiscal consolidation amounting to 5.7 
percent of GDP in the space of 3 years, one of the largest in the European Union (figure 1).  
Table 1: Key macroeconomic and fiscal data and projections (percent of GDP): 2008-2016 
  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
Real  GDP 
growth 
7.3  -7.1  -1.3  2.0  1.8  3.5  4.0  4.0  4.0 
                   
Revenue  and 
grants 
32.2  31.4    32.8  33.0  33.6  34.1  34.3  34.4  34.6 
Expenditure  37.0  38.7  39.4  37.3  35.5  35.5  35.6  35.3  34.9 
Fiscal 
balance 
-4.8  -7.3  -6.5  -4.3  -1.9  -1.4  -1.3  -0.9  -0.3 
Structural 
balance 
-8.5  -7.0  -5.1  -2.8  -0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.6 
Gross  public 
debt 
13.6  23.9  31.7  34.5  35.8  34.5  32.8  30.9  28.5 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2011 6 
 
Fiscal consolidation began in 2010 and comprises several measures on both the expenditure and 
revenue sides of the budget. The number of employees on the public payroll has been reduced 
from 1.399 million at its peak in 2008 to 1.267 million in January 2011 (Romania Fiscal Council, 
2011: 19). Salaries have been cut by about 10 percent on a net basis during 2010 and 2011 (there 
was a 25 percent cut in 2010 and a 15 percent rise in 2011) and various bonuses and the 13
th 
month salary payment have been abolished. The cuts in the public payroll and salaries have 
reduced salary and wage expenditures in the general government budget from 9.4 percent of 
GDP in 2009 to a projected 7.5 percent of GDP in 2011. On the revenue side there have been 
increases in the VAT rate, the elimination of some minor VAT loopholes and increases in social 
security contributions.  
Figure 1:   Romania’s  fiscal  consolidation  in  comparison  with  that  of  other  EU 
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The central government had almost eliminated expenditure arrears by the end of 2010, although 
local government arrears remain.
3 Revenues have been boosted by a hike in the VAT rate from 
18 to 24 percent and a rise of 3 percentage points in social security contributions.  
 
The medium-term fiscal framework envisages that the structural fiscal balance will be slightly 
positive on average from 2013 through to 2016. The conventional (nonstructural) fiscal balance 
is projected to be lower than the structural fiscal deficit, because the economy will operate with a 
negative output gap throughout the medium-term horizon. Nevertheless, from 2012 onward the 
conventional deficit will be lower than 3 percent of GDP and hence will be in compliance with 
the fiscal deficit ceiling of less than 3 percent of GDP in the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). 
 
2.2 Public debt 
Gross public debt rose sharply between 2008 and 2011, by 21 percent of GDP, because of the 
large fiscal deficits incurred in this period (table 1). However, public debt as a share of GDP is 
projected to flatten out at just under 36 percent of GDP during 2011-2013 before declining to 
28.5 percent of GDP in 2016; a debt burden which does not, per se, signal major dangers to debt 
sustainability and is well within the 60 percent of GDP ceiling in the SGP.   
 
Table 2 details some of the pertinent characteristics of public debt. The share of multilateral debt 
in total debt rose by 8 percentage points between 2008 and 2010, reflecting the government’s 
recourse to borrowing from the EU, the World Bank and the IMF following the global financial 
crisis.  Multilateral  loans  have  been  contracted  at  interest  rates  more  favorable  than  those 
available on the international financial markets: interest rates on multilateral loans have ranged 
                                                 
3 Local Government arrears are relatively small: the stock amounted to 0.4 percent of GDP in 2010 and is owed 
mostly to private sector contractors and suppliers. Fiscal management is weak in some local authorities, but the 
structure of their finances means that the deficits that they can incur are limited mostly to payment arrears; hence 
public finance in local government is not a serious threat to fiscal sustainability at the national level.   8 
 
between 2 percent and 3.4 percent, compared to 5-6 percent for foreign currency denominated 
securities issued on international markets.
4 
  Table 2: Characteristics of public debt, percent of total public debt: 2008-10 
  2008  2009   2010 
Share of debt by type of creditor       
  Multilateral  20.4  25.4  28.8 
  Bilateral  0.3  0.2  0.2 
  Private banks and other  79.3  74.4  71.0 
Share of debt by currency       
  Domestic  59.7  47.1  45.3 
  Foreign  40.3  52.9  54.7 
Share of debt by maturity       
  short term  49.3  37.8  35.2 
  medium term  10.7  19.9  23.4 
  Long term  40.1  42.4  41.4 
Average remaining maturity of debt (years)  3.0  3.7  4.0 
 domestic   1.4  2.0  2.1 
 External  5.5  6.5  7.0 
Share of debt by interest rare       
  Fixed  31.3  42.4  52.0 
  Floating  68.7  57.6  48.0 
Source:  Romanian  Ministry  of  Public  Finance  (2011),  “Report  on  Public  Debt  Management”,  Bucharest, 
http://www.mfinante.ro/rapoarteMFP.html?pagina=domenii 
 
Recourse to multilateral loans has brought about some positive movements in the characteristics 
of public debt (table 2). The maturity structure of public debt has been lengthened, with short-
                                                 
4 The Government issued a 5 year Eurobond at a yield of 5.17 percent in March 2010.  9 
 
term  loans  falling  by  14  percentage  points  as  a  share  of  total  debt  and  medium-term  loans 
increasing by 13 percentage points between 2008 and 2010. The average remaining maturity of 
public debt increased from 3 years in 2008 to 4 years in 2010.  The government’s debt strategy 
aims to raise the average remaining maturity of the public debt to 4.5 years over the medium 
term, by issuing more medium and long-term securities on the domestic market and reducing the 
amount of short-term securities issued (Ministry of Public Finance, 2011). The share of fixed 
interest rate debt in the debt portfolio also rose from 31 percent to 52 percent. On a less positive 
note, the share of foreign currency denominated debt in the debt portfolio increased from 40 
percent  in  2008  to  55  percent  in  2010,  which  is  attributable  to  both  the  borrowing  from 
multilateral lenders and the issuance of foreign currency denominated securities on the domestic 
market to meet demand for these securities from local banks.  
 
The measures taken to strengthen public finances and thus curb the growth of public debt appear 
to have brought about an improvement in investor confidence. Standard & Poors and Fitch both 
revised the outlook on Romania’s sovereign credit rating of BB+ from negative to stable in 2010. 
CDS spreads on public debt dropped from 610 basis points (bps) in February 2009 to 290 bps at 
the end of 2010 (Ministry of Public Finance, 2011).  
 
Romania’s medium-term public debt dynamics appear quite favorable, in the main because the 
average real interest rate on government debt is very low; it was 0.8 percent in 2010 and is 
projected to decline to zero by 2016.
5 The low real interest rate on public debt is attributable to 
the large share of loans from the multilateral lenders in the public debt portf olio which are at 
interest rates which are lower than those which Romania pays on the debt which it has issued to 
the market. Nevertheless, it is likely that the average real interest rate on government debt will 
rise above zero over the long term, because  Romania will gradually reduce its borrowing from 
the multilateral lenders and replace it with borrowing from the domestic and international 
markets, where interest rates will be higher.  In 2011, the government issued Euro denominated 
medium-term  notes  on  the  international  market,  to  maintain  Romania’s  presence  in  the 
international capital markets. 
                                                 
5 This projection is from the Debt Sustainability Analysis of the World Bank and IMF. 10 
 
 
Slower medium to long-run GDP growth will adversely affect long-run debt dynamics. If the real 
growth rate falls below the average real interest rate on public debt, government will have to 
accumulate primary fiscal surpluses in order to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio. Moreover, lower 
real GDP growth will reduce the growth of the tax base and hence make it more difficult to 
achieve an increase in the primary fiscal balance. The possible consequences of demographic 
changes for long-term real GDP growth are discussed in Section 4. 
 
Romania’s  planned  adoption  of  the  Euro  in  2015  will  affect  public  debt  management.  All 
domestic  currency  denominated  debt  will  have  to  be  converted  into  foreign  currency 
denominated debt, most probably Euro denominated debt. Once Romania enters the Euro Zone, 
the  distinction  between  domestic  and  foreign  currency  denominated  debt  will  disappear  and 
hence the exchange rate risk attached to the former, for foreign investors, will no longer be 
applicable, which could help to ease borrowing costs. 
 
To conclude this  section, the data on  general  government  deficits  and public debt  reviewed 
above do not, per se, indicate serious threats to fiscal sustainability in Romania. However, two 
caveats are necessary. First, the improvement in the structural balance equivalent to 5.7 percent 
of GDP between 2008 and 2011 has only been possible as a result of draconian cuts to public 
expenditure,  including  cuts  in  the  public  payroll,  public  sector  wages  and  a  range  of  social 
welfare benefits as well as increases in VAT rates and social contributions. Political support for 
these cuts and tax hikes may dissipate once the immediate fiscal crisis has passed; hence they 
may not be politically sustainable. The forthcoming elections in 2012 and 2014 will be a test of 
public support for fiscal consolidation. Second, there are threats to fiscal sustainability arising 
from public sector deficits which are not currently captured in general government fiscal data 
and  from  long-term  demographic  trends.  These  issues  are  addressed  in  the  following  two 
sections. 
   11 
 
3. Quasi fiscal deficits of state owned enterprises 
 
Romania has a large public enterprise sector, comprising 722 state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
which account for 8.9 percent of employment and 10 percent of GDP.
6 The most important 
SOEs, in terms of size, are in the energy and transport sectors. Comprehensive financial data on 
all SOEs are not available. Based on the data  which are available, the SOE sector in aggregate 
was barely profitable in the mid -2000s. Its performance deteriorated from 2007 and the SOE 
sector in aggregate incurred losses  in 2008 and in subsequent years. However, the financial 
performance of SOEs is h eterogeneous; about 70 percent of SOEs are both profitable and 
solvent, although some nevertheless receive budget subsidies, including cancellation of debts 
owed to the state. The remaining 30 percent of SOEs are making losses and/or are insolvent. 
These losses represent quasi fiscal deficits (QFDs);  deficits incurred off budget by public 
agencies  in  the  pursuit  of  public  policy  objectives.  The  trends  in  profitability  should  be 
interpreted with caution, however, because the financial statements of the SOEs,  from which 
these data are drawn, sometimes disguise hidden subsidies or costs. 
   
                                                 
6 These are World Bank estimates. Official data on the exact number of SOEs and their contribution to the economy 
are not available. 12 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in profitability of the SOEs in the energy and gas sector; 2005-2010H1 
 
Source: Romanian Ministry of Public Finance (2011), “Fiscal Information and Balance Sheets”, 




Figure 3: Trends in profitability of the SOEs in the transport and storage sector; 2005-
2010H1 
 
Source:  Romanian Ministry of Public Finance (2011), “Fiscal Information and Balance Sheets”, 
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Figure 4: Trends in profitability of the SOEs in the mining and quarrying sector; 2005-
2010H1 
 
Source:  Romanian Ministry of Public Finance (2011), “Fiscal Information and Balance Sheets”, 
http://www.mfinante.ro/pjuridice.html?pagina=domenii, and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the trends  in  profitability  of the SOEs in  the energy and gas  sector, which 
accounts for 31 percent of total SOE activity. The net profit of the SOEs in the energy and gas 
sector has been negative since 2007. The profitability of the SOEs in the transport and storage 
sector,  accounting  for  24  percent  of  total  SOE  activity,  has  deteriorated  even  more  sharply 
(figure 3), with the sector suffering large losses in 2008, 2009 and the first half of 2010. The 
third largest SOE sector, mining and quarrying, has also incurred losses since 2007 (figure 4). 
The SOE sector also has incurred an increasing amount of arrears, mainly to suppliers, the social 
insurance  budget  and  taxes.  Total  SOE  arrears  amounted  to  4.8  percent  of  GDP  in  2010 
(Romania Fiscal Council, 2011:44). 
 
The poor financial performance of the SOEs weakens fiscal sustainability through two channels. 
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revenues of social insurance funds. Second, the SOEs which are receiving large subsidies from 
central  government  are  a  direct  burden  on  the  state.  SOEs  are  not  included  in  the  general 
government fiscal data. However, under Eurostat rules, an SOE should be included in the general 
government data if more than half of its revenues are derived from government subsidies over a 
three year period. Around 30 SOEs are likely to be included in the general government budget in 
2011, which will worsen the recorded general government fiscal balance by about 0.5 percent of 
GDP. 
 
4. The fiscal challenges of an aging population 
 
4.1 Long-run demographic trends 
 
Romania’s long term demographic forecasts are a source of concern for both economic growth 
and public finances. The population has already fallen by about 10 percent since 1990, from 23 
million to the current level of 21 million, of whom 2-3 million are working abroad. Romania’s 
population is forecast to shrink further, by 20 percent between 2008 and 2060.
7 The contraction 
in the population of working age over this period is even larger  – about 35 percent – the second 
largest in the EU, after Bulgaria. The share in the total population of people aged 65 and above 
will rise from the current level of about 15 percent to over 30 percent by 2060, the third oldest in 
the EU.
 8 The old age dependency ratio – the ratio of people aged 65 and above to the working 
age population is forecast to rise from the current level of about 20 percent to 65 percent by 2060 
(figure 5).    
 
Demographic trends of this nature are clearly an impediment to long-term growth. With the 
workforce  contracting  by  an  average  of  0.8  percent  a  year  over  the  next  half  century,  it  is 
unlikely that Romania will be able to sustain the 4 percent real GDP growth which is forecast for 
                                                 
7 The population has already fallen by about 10 percent since 1990, from 23 million to the current level of 21 
million.  
8 The data are from Eurostat. 15 
 
2014-16  beyond  the  medium  term,  because  this  would  require  annual  increases  in  labor 
productivity of 5 percent, which is unrealistic. Moreover, the adverse demographic trends will 
reduce domestic savings, because of the rise in the dependency ratio, which will undermine the 
economy’s capacity to undertake the investment in physical and human capital which will be 
needed to achieve rapid growth in labor productivity.  
 
 
Figure 5: Projections of Dependency Ratios in Romania and the European Union 
 
Source: Eurostat, EUROPOP2008 Convergence scenario, regional level, April 2011 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/metadata?p_product_code=PROJ_R08C_ESMS 
 
4.2 Fiscal implications of population aging 
 
The EU Commission’s Ageing Working Group has prepared estimates of the age related fiscal 
costs for all EU members over the next 50 years. The Ageing Working Group has combined 
these costs with the current fiscal position of EU members to derive estimates of the upfront 
fiscal  adjustment  which  is  required  to  ensure  long  run  fiscal  sustainability.  Two  separate 
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(S1 indicator) is the adjustment needed to bring public debt to the SGP target of 60 percent of 
GDP or less by 2060. The second (S2 indicator) is the fiscal adjustment needed to satisfy the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint over an infinite horizon.  
 
The Ageing Working Group estimates that age related expenditures will increase by 8.5 percent 
of GDP in Romania by 2060, almost double the EU average of 4.4 percent of GDP (figure 6). It 
estimates that the upfront fiscal adjustment needed to ensure fiscal sustainability, as a result of 
the fiscal costs of demographic aging alone, are between 3.2 percent and 4.9 percent of GDP. 
 
Figure 6:   Increase in Age-related Public Expenditures in the European Union, 2010-
2060, percent of GDP 
 
Source:  European Commission (2009), “2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 
Member States (2008-2060)”, Brussels 
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The sustainability of Romania’s state pension system has already worsened sharply in the 20 
years since the transition from the socialist economy began. The state pension system in the 
socialist economy was a pay-as-you-go system with relatively generous benefits. In the last two 
decades  the  number  of  wage  earners  in  the  economy,  who  make  contributions  to  the  state 
pension scheme, has fallen by almost 50 percent, from 8 million to over 4 million, because of 
migration, a fall in the labour force participation rate, unemployment and the growth of informal 
employment. During the same period, the number of state pensioners has risen from just over 2 
million to nearly 5 million. As a result the dependency ratio in the state pension system – the 
ratio of contributors to the state insurance funds to pensioners - fell from 3.43 in 1990 to 0.89 in 
2010 (see figure 7). 
 
The Romanian government has implemented a number of measures over the last two decades to 
restore financial viability to the social security system. Contribution rates have been raised. The 
combined contribution rates for pensions, unemployment and health insurance are now over 44 
percent of salaries, which is in itself a disincentive to formal sector employment. Social security 
contribution rates in the 10 new member states of the EU are shown in table 3. As can be seen in 
the table, contribution rates are very high in several of the new member states which share 
similar problems with Romania in respect of their social security systems.  
   18 
 
 
Figure 7:   Numbers of wage earners and pensioners (millions), the dependency ratio in 
the state pension system; 1990-2010 
 
Source: National House of Public Pensions of Romania (May 2011), “Statistical Indicators Pillar I”,  Bucharest.  
http://www.cnpas.org/portal/media-type/html/language/ro/country/null/user/ 
 
Further reforms to the pension system were implemented during the 2000s. These included an 
increase in the retirement age by 5 years, reform to the benefit formula and the introduction of a 
multi-pillar  pension  system  in  2008.  The  multi-pillar  system  added  a  mandatory,  privately 
managed, defined contribution, second pillar and a voluntary, privately managed, third pillar to 
the existing public, defined benefit, first pillar of the pension system.
9  
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Table 3: Social security contributions rates in the 10 new member states in 2010, percent
 
Source: European Commission (2011) ''Taxes in Europe - Tax reforms'' database, 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tedb/taxSearch.html 
 
The pension reforms reduced pension expenditures by the state pension system and, together 
with  strong economic growth in  the 2000s, which boosted contributions  from  wage earners, 
improved the financial performance of the state pension system (table 4). The pension system 
even  managed  to  achieve  a  small  surplus  of  revenues  over  expenditures  in  2006  and  2007.  
However, several changes were implemented in 2007 which increased pension benefits, such as 
restoring the indexation of net benefits to gross wages, and the introduction of a mandatory gross 
replacement ratio of 45 percent.
10 There were further changes in 2009 and 2010, including the 
guarantee of a minimum pension for low income pensioners and increases in contribution rates.  
Another “pension reform” was introduced for agriculture pensioners, in 2010, which implies 
significant additional costs for the state. As a result, pension expenditures have risen steeply, 
from 5.4 percent of GDP in 2006 to 8.3 percent of GDP in 2010. The increase in expenditures 
                                                 
10 The replacement ratio is the ratio of net average pensions to gross average earnings. The average replacement 
ratio in Romania was 0.56 in 2009, compared to the average for the EU of 0.51. 
SK HU CZ RO PL LT SI LV EE BG
Employer 14.0 24.0 21.5 20.8 9.8 23.3 8.9 - - 8.9
Employee 4.0 9.5 6.5 10.5 9.8 3.0 15.5 - - 7.1
Total 18.0 33.5 28.0 31.3 19.5 26.3 24.4 - - 16.0
Employer 1.0 - 1.2 0.5 - 1.1 0.1 - - 0.4
Employee 1.0 - 0.0 0.5 - - 0.1 - - 0.6
Total 2.0 - 1.2 1.0 - 1.1 0.2 - - 1.0
Employer 10.0 2.0 9.0 5.2 0.0 3.0 7.1 - - 0.0
Employee 4.0 6.0 4.5 5.5 9.0 6.0 6.4 - - 8.0
Total 14.0 8.0 13.5 10.7 9.0 9.0 13.5 - - 8.0
Employer 10.2 4.0 2.6 1.4 4.9 3.7 0.1 - - 1.8
Employee 4.4 3.0 0.0 - 4.0 - 0.1 - - 2.1
Total 14.6 7.0 2.6 - 8.9 3.7 0.2 - - 3.9
Employer 35.2 30.0 34.3 27.9 14.7 31.1 16.1 24.1 33.0 11.1
Employee 13.4 18.5 11.0 16.5 22.7 9.0 22.1 9.0 0.0 17.8









has plunged the pension system back into deficit. It incurred a deficit equivalent to 2.1 percent of 
GDP in 2010 (table 4). 
 
Table 4:   Revenues  and Expenditures  of the State  Pension Fund (percent of GDP); 
2001-2011 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Revenues  6.3  6.2  6.2  6.1  6.1  5.7  5.9  6.1  6.9  6.2 
Expenditures  7.2  7.0  6.5  6.8  6.3  5.4  5.7  6.6  8.1  8.3 
Balance  -0.9  -0.8  -0.4  -0.7  -0.2  0.3  0.2  -0.5  -1.2  -2.1 
Revenues exclude state subsidy                 




A new pension law was enacted in December 2010 to improve the financial viability of the 
public pension system. The new law included the following provisions:  a phased increase of the 
retirement ages of women to 63 years; a phased switch to the price indexation of pension benefits 
(from wage indexation); increased penalties for early retirement; the incorporation into the public 
pension  scheme  of  the  special  sectors  pensions  schemes  (for  defense,  interior,  intelligence, 
etc.)
11; the  integration of new categ ories of contributors ( e.g. the  self-employed) within the 
public pensions system; the introduction of a maximum ceiling for  the contribution base; and 
tightened eligibility criteria for disability benefits. 
The new pension law is projected to reduce public pension expenditures substantially over the 
long term. By 2025, pension expenditures based on the pension legislation in force immediately 
prior to the enactment of the new law, were projected to reach 10.5  percent of GDP, with the 
                                                 
11  The  state  pension  system  included,  alongside  the  ordinary  public  pensions,  separate  schemes  for  specific 
categories of state employees; the army, the police, the secret services, civil aviation and support staff, Parliament, 
diplomats, magistrates and support staff, etc. These special pension schemes provided much more generous benefits 
than the ordinary public pensions, with replacement rates of 80-100% of the last 1-6 month salary earnings. In 2010, 
about 200,000 people received special pensions at a total cost to the budget of 1 percent of GDP. The special 
pension schemes are analysed in Dragota and Miricescu (2010).   21 
 
pension system deficit projected at 4.5 percent of GDP. The new pension law is projected to cut 
pension expenditures to 6.9 percent of GDP by 2025, a fall of 3.5 percent of GDP, with a fall of 
similar magnitude in the pension system deficit (table 5). The new pension law still leaves the 
public pension system in deficit over the long term, but the deficit is reduced to relatively low 
levels.  
 
Table 5:   Projected expenditures and balance of the public pension system, percent of 
GDP; 2011-2025 
  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2020  2025 
Baseline               
  Expenditures  7.9  7.9  8.0  8.1  8.1  9.1  10.5 
  Balance  -1.7  -1.7  -1.8  -1.8  -1.9  -3.2  -4.5 
               
New law               
  Expenditures  7.5  7.2  7.2  7.1  7.1  6.9  6.9 
  Balance  -1.5  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.3  -1.4  -1.0 
Projections do not include special pension regimes 
Baseline refers to projections based on the pension legislation prior to 2010 
Source: World Bank PROST projections 
 
The rationale for the introduction of new, defined contribution pillars is to reduce the burden on 
the defined benefit state pension system, as well as to stimulate capital market development. 
However, the transition to a multi pillar pension system involves budgetary costs, because a 
share of the contributions of the working population has to be diverted from the state pension 
system to finance the second pillar. Because they are designed to be fully funded, the second 
pillar pension systems raise fiscal costs in the short to medium term, but reduce costs in the long 
term. The government froze a planned increase in contribution rates to the second pillar in 2010 22 
 
because of the fiscal costs.
12 However, this only creates future fiscal liabilities and hence is not a 
sustainable long-term solution.  
 
To  conclude,  the  government  has  implemented  major  reforms  to  improve  the  financial 
sustainability of the public pension system, with the enactment of the 2010 pension law. This has 
curtailed the real value of benefits to pensioners and will cut pension expenditures by about a 
third by 2025. However, pensioners are an important political constituency and will become even 
more electorally powerful over the next 50 years as their relative voting strength increases. 
Hence government is likely to face strong political pressures to reverse some  of the pension 
reforms and provide more generous benefits to pensioners. Any further increases in contribution 
rates are not likely to be feasible, because this would discourage participation by workers. Hence 
if there are changes to the state pension which raise the future value of real pension benefits, the 
deficit of the pension system will also be increased. A larger burden of financing pensions will 
thus fall on the general taxpayer. 
 
5. Can revenue mobilization be strengthened? 
 
Romania has the lowest government revenue to GDP ratio in the EU. In 2010 revenue was 33 
percent of GDP compared to an EU average of 42 percent. Even relatively modest increases in 
the revenue/GDP ratio could make an important contribution to fiscal sustainability in the long 
run.  
 
The main reason why the revenue/GDP ratio is relatively low in Romania is that tax compliance 
is very weak. In addition, the tax base is both narrow and there are numerous exemptions. Tax 
collections are only a small fraction of the theoretical maximum collection, given the legal tax 
rates and the size of the tax base. This can be seen by looking at the implicit tax rates for various 
taxes. Implicit tax rates are calculated as the ratio of the actual revenue collected from a given 
                                                 
12 Similar steps have been taken by several other new member states of the EU which established multi pillar 
pension systems in the 2000s (Barbone, 2011). 23 
 
tax handle to the size of the tax base for that tax handle. Comparing the implicit tax rates with the 
legal tax rates provides an indication of the level of tax compliance in the economy (table 6). 
 
Table 6  Implicit and legal tax rates  
  Legal tax rate  Implicit  tax 
rate 
Implicit  rate  as 
percent of legal rate 
Personal income tax   16  5.8  36.3 
Corporate income tax   16  5.4  33.8 
Social contributions   43  20.8  46.8 
VAT  18  10.8  60.0 
Data pertains to 2010 except for VAT which is 2009  
Source: Eurostat, Romanian National Institute of Statistics,  Romanian Ministry of Public Finance, Fiscal Council, 
and authors’ calculations 
 
Tax compliance with the personal and corporate income tax is particularly poor; less than 40 
percent for both tax handles which probably reflects the large share of informal employment in 
the economy – estimated at between 20 percent and 25 percent of total employment - as well as 
tax evasion. Tax compliance has also weakened since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. 
The Romania Fiscal Council estimated that the losses of personal income tax arising from tax 
evasion from undeclared work amounted to 1 percent of GDP in 2009, while losses of social 
contributions from undeclared work amounted to 3.3 percent of GDP. 
 
Romania replaced a progressive income tax, with rates between 18 and 40 percent, with a flat tax 
in 2005, set at 16 percent. One of the merits of a flat tax is that it is supposed to encourage 
compliance and simplify tax administration, but the implicit tax rate on personal income was 
only fractionally higher in 2010 than it was prior to the introduction of the flat tax (figure 8). For 
the  corporate  income  tax,  the  implicit  tax  rate  in  2010  was  lower  than  it  was  prior  to  the 24 
 
introduction of the flat tax rate. Revenue from income taxes has been undermined by many 
exemptions which remained in place when the flat tax was introduced. 
 
Figure 8  Trends in the legal and implicit tax rates for personal income tax and social 
security contributions: 2001-10  
 
Source: Eurostat, Romanian National Institute of Statistics , Romanian Ministry of Public Finance, Fiscal Council, 
and authors’ calculations 
 
Compliance with VAT is the lowest in the EU. This is illustrated by the VAT gap, which is 
calculated as the ratio of VAT not collected to total VAT liabilities. The VAT gap in Romania 
was about 37 percent, the highest in the EU by a large margin (see figure 9). The Romania Fiscal 
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Figure 9  The VAT gap in EU countries (2006) 
 
Sources:  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Taxation  and  Customs  Union,  Reckon  Report,  2009, 
Romanian National Institute of Statistics, Fiscal Council  
 
To conclude this section, revenue collections in Romania have been undermined by tax evasion 
of both direct and indirect taxes. With total losses from tax evasion estimated at about 10 percent 
of GDP or more, efforts to strengthen tax compliance should be a priority for public policy. 
Improving tax administration offers the scope for improving revenue collections, by reducing tax 
evasion, without having to raise tax rates.   
 



































































6. Impact of the Euro area crisis on fiscal sustainability 
 
The intensification of the Euro area sovereign debt crisis over the summer of 2011 has worsened 
the economic prospects for all of the economies on the periphery of the EU, including Romania. 
The core of the Euro area economy faces slower real growth and could tip back into recession. In 
the September 2011 volume of the World Economic Outlook, the IMF reduced the real GDP 
growth forecast for the Euro area by 0.4 and 0.6 percentage points respectively for 2011 and 
2012, to 1.6 percent and 1.1 percent. There are substantial downside risks to these forecasts 
which could materialize if the financial crisis facing the Eurozone were to intensify.  
 
The weakening economic prospects in the Eurozone have already affected growth forecasts for 
Romania.  The IMF has downgraded the 2012 real GDP forecast from 4.4 percent to 1.8 percent. 
Over the five year period 2012-16, the IMF has cut a cumulative 3.7 percentage points from the 
medium-term growth forecasts, compared to the forecasts made in the first half of 2011. Even 
these new, lower forecasts for GDP growth look optimistic. Forecasted medium-term growth in 
Romania is largely export driven. The latest IMF forecasts (consistent with the reduced GDP 
growth forecasts) entail Romanian exports of goods and services in real terms growing at an 
average of 7.4 percent per annum during 2012-16. This is much faster than demand in the Euro 
area, which is the main destination for Romania’s exports, is likely to grow over this period. As 
such it may not be possible to achieve export growth of this magnitude which in turn will depress 
real GDP growth in Romania. 
 
A  lower  medium-term  growth  rate  of  GDP  has  adverse  implications  for  fiscal  balances. 
Revenues will be lower because of the smaller tax base, hence without expenditure cuts fiscal 
balances, expressed in Ron, will be lower (i.e. deficits will be larger) and public debt higher. 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, deficits will be larger still because of the lower denominator, 
as will the public debt/GDP ratio. The Romanian government could attempt to maintain its fiscal 
consolidation  path  by  cutting  expenditures,  but  this  would  risk  further  weakening  domestic 
demand and hence depressing the real GDP growth rate over the medium term. A further threat 27 
 
to fiscal balances will arise if the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone triggers a rise in interest 
rates for all of the sovereign borrowers on the periphery, including Romania, as this will increase 






Romania has recently implemented important reforms to strengthen its public finances, mainly 
by cutting public expenditure. As a result the structural fiscal deficit has been reduced from 8.5 
percent of GDP in 2008 to a projected 2.8 percent of GDP in 2011. The fiscal consolidation is 
sufficient to prevent public debt from rising above 36 percent of GDP over the medium term. 
Even if the losses of state owned enterprises are brought into the budget, the impact on the fiscal 
deficit will be relatively small; about 0.5 percent of GDP. However, slower real GDP growth 
and/or  higher  borrowing  costs,  which  could  be  a  consequence  of  an  intensification  of  the 
financial crisis in the Euro area, could undermine the Romanian government’s efforts to bring 
the structural balance to zero and to stabilize the public debt/GDP ratio over the medium term. 
 
Looking  beyond  the  short  to  medium  term,  serious  challenges  will  emerge  to  fiscal 
sustainability.  Over  the  long  term  Romania  faces  unfavorable  demographic  trends.  The 
workforce is projected to contract at about 0.8 percent a year on average over the next 50 years. 
This implies that it will be very difficult to sustain the real GDP growth rates of 4 percent per 
annum  beyond  the  medium  term,  without  very  high  annual  increases  in  labor  productivity. 
Lower  real  GDP  growth  over  the  long  term  will  have  adverse  consequences  for  fiscal 
sustainability because it means that less budgetary resources will be mobilized to fund public 
spending. In addition, the average real interest rate paid on public debt will rise over the long 
term because Romania will need to rely less on loans from multilateral institutions and more on 
borrowing from domestic and international markets. Higher real interest rates on public debt and 28 
 
lower real GDP growth rates imply that the primary fiscal balance which is  consistent with 
stabilizing the public debt to GDP ratio must rise.   
 
Romania’s adverse long-term demographic trends also imply increasing deficits of the public 
pension  system,  which  already  has  more  beneficiaries  than  contributors.  The  new  pension 
legislation enacted at the end of 2010 is projected to reduce the pension deficit to about 1 percent 
of GDP in 2025 through drastic cuts in entitlements to benefits. Whether the financial viability of 
the public pension system can be sustained over the long term by holding down the value of 
pension benefits in a society where the aged will constitute a numerically important share of the 
electorate must be considered doubtful. Moreover, it is not axiomatic that the solution to the 
financial viability of the public pension system should be found within the system itself. There is 
no reason in principle why a public pension deficit should not be funded from general budgetary 
resources, provided that this does not undermine fiscal sustainability; the difficulty of doing this 
is  the  scarcity  of  budgetary  resources  and  the  many  other  competing  claims  for  public 
expenditure.  
 
Given that the scope for further cuts in public expenditure is likely to be very limited, Romania 
should look towards the revenue side of the budget to help maintain fiscal sustainability.  If 
revenue mobilization can be strengthened, Romania may be able to maintain fiscal sustainability 
without  imposing  too  great  a  hardship  on  pensioners  and  users  of  essential  public  services. 
Fortunately, there appears to be room for boosting revenue mobilization. Romania has the lowest 
tax effort, measured in terms of the tax/GDP ratio, in the EU, in part because of widespread tax 
evasion  together  with  the  large  share  of  informal  labor  in  the  workforce.  If  the  revenue 
authorities could reduce the amount of tax lost to evasion and fraud by only 50 percent, the 
revenue gains would amount to more than 4 percent of GDP.  
 
Fiscal sustainability involves risk and uncertainty, because even if current fiscal policies are 
considered sustainable, the future cannot be known with certainty. Long term fiscal sustainability 
is vulnerable to fiscal shocks, such as adverse macroeconomic shocks. It is almost inevitable that 29 
 
one or more major negative fiscal shocks will occur over a time horizon that extends beyond the 
medium term. Hence the capacity of a government to adjust to an adverse fiscal shock is also a 
factor which affects fiscal sustainability. This depends on various factors: Can more revenue be 
mobilized by raising tax rates? Is there fiscal space to run temporarily lower fiscal balances until 
the shock has subsided? Building more flexibility and resilience into the fiscal system would 
make an important contribution to enhancing fiscal sustainability in Romania.  
 
In the final analysis, whether Romania can maintain fiscal sustainability will be determined by 
politics; there must be sufficient understanding within the polity of the importance of sustainable 
fiscal policies and a broad consensus on such policies.  
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